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Wildermuth v. State: DEFENDANT'S
CONFRONTATION RIGHT NOT
VIOlA TED BY ALLOWING
ALLEGED ABUSED CIDID TO
TESTIFY VIA CLOSED CIRCUIT
TELEVISION
In Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530
A.2d 245 (1987), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article S 9-102, which allows
the testimony of an alleged abused child to
be taken via closed-circuit television, does
not violate the right of the defendant to
confront his accuser. Moreover, the judge
must determine that the child's testimony
in open court "will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that
the child cannot reasonably communicate" as a condition precedent to the
invocation of S 9-102.
Appellants Wildermuth and McKoy
were separately tried and convicted of
child abuse in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County. At their respective trials,
the judge allowed the alleged child victims
to testify via closed-circuit television, pursuant to S 9-102, which provides in pertinent part that:
(a)(1) In a case of abuse of a child as
defined in S 5-901 of the Family Law
Article or Article 27, S 35A of the
Code, a court may order that the testimony of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the
courtroom by means of closed-circuit
television if: (i) The testimony is taken
during the proceeding; and (ii) The
judge determines that testimony by
the child victim in the courtroom will
result in the child suffering serious
emotional distress such that the child
cannot reasonably communicate.
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-102
(a)(1) (1984).
While the Appellants' cases were pending in the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari and consolidated the cases to address the issues raised
by both Appellants.
On appeal, the court addressed the issue
of whether § 9-102 denies the defendant
the right to confront his accuser under the
sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. Both
Appellants argued that § 9-102 denies them
the right of confrontation. In Wildermuth's case, the judge directed the use of
closed-circuit television on the basis that
two expert witnesses testified that the
child witness would be traumatized if she
were to testify in open court. In McKoy's
case, the judge allowed the use of closed-

circuit television after the child witness
was called to testify in open court but
became upset and unable to reasonably
communicate.
The court had to determine whether
actual physical confrontation was within
the intended scope of the sixth amendment
and article 21.
After discussing the history of the right
of confrontation, the court concluded that
when the Maryland Declaration of Rights
and the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution were adopted, it was
generally accepted that witnesses "ordinarily would meet the accused face-toface in open court." Wildermuth, 310 Md.
at 506, 530 A.2d at 280. For example, in
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237
(1895), the United States Supreme Court
noted that the use of physical confrontation was:
to prevent depositions or ex parte
affidavits, such as were sometimes used
in civil cases, being used against the
prisoner in lieu of personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience
of the witness, but of compelling him
to stand face to face with the witness,
but of compelling him to stand face to
face with the jury in order that they
may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief.

Id. at 504. Similarly, the court in Crawford
v. State, stated that: "it is the primary
object of the constitutional provision
requiring confrontation to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits from being used
against a person accused of a crime in lieu
of personal examination and crossexamination of the witnesses." Crawford
v. State, 282 Md. 210, 214, 383 A.2d 1097,
1099 (1978).
The court went on to consider the purposes underlying the right of confrontation. It noted Wigmore's view that
confrontation is a means to protect full
cross-examination as well as to allow the
judge and jury the opportunity to observe
the witness' "deportment while testifying," which bears on credibility. Wilder·
muth, 310 Md. at 507, 530 A.2d at 281. The
advantages from the witness' physical presence are more for the benefit of the tribunal than for the benefit of the accused. Id.
Indeed, many courts have found that confrontation does not have to be in the
nature
of an
"eyeball-to-eyeball"
encounter between the defendant and his

accuser. Id. But the essential purpose of
confrontation is to facilitate the search for
truth, which ordinarily requires crossexamination and the presence of the
witness before the fact-fmder and the
defendant.ld. at 509,530 A.2d at 281. The
court found that these latter confrontation
requirements were satisfied in the present
cases since cross-examination did occur
and the fact-finders as well as the defendants could view the witnesses during their
testimony. Id. at 510, 530 A.2d at 282.
However, the question remained
whether the defendants' confrontation
rights were denied when the child
witnesses were allowed to testify without
having to view the defendants. The court
examined cases where the denial of a faceto-face challenge was found to violate sixth
amendment rights or article 21 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. For
example, in United States v. Benfte/d, the
Eighth Circuit held that a procedure under
which the witness' deposition was taken
via a television monitor in a separate room
from the defendant and then later shown
to the jury, was a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment rights since
"recollection veracity, and communication are influenced by face-to-face challenge." United States v. Benfield, 593 F .2d
815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979). And in Dutton v.
State, the court held that the right to confrontation, pursuant to article 21, was
violated when the defendant was excluded
from the room in which the witness testified. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A.
417 (1914). Thus, the court concluded that
the "right of confrontation ordinarily
includes . . . the right of the accused to be
seen by his accuser ... " Wildermuth, 310
Md. at 512, 530 A.2d at 282. Moreover, if
the accuser must see the defendant face-toface, the search for truth will be enhanced
since it "tends to impress upon the witness
the seriousness and solemnity of the occasion, and as a consequence, the neccessity
for truthful testimony." Id.
Notwithstanding the benefits derived
from face-to-face challenges, there are occasions when it is permissible to allow the
accuser to testify without having to view
the defendant. Essentially, there are limitations to the constitutional right of confrontation. The Supreme Court found
support for the proposition in Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), where the transcribed testimony given by a witness during a preliminary hearing was held to have
been properly introduced at trial, since the
witness was "unavailable," and there was
sufficient evidence to show that the testimony was "reliable." Id.
In the present case, the court had to
determine whether the "unavailability"
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and "reliability" prongs of the Roberts test
were satisfied. Reliability can be established by the ordinary aspects of confrontation such as "cross-examination,
testimony under oath, [and the] ability of
[the] judge, jury, and accused to view the
witness during [his] testimony." Wilder·
muth, 310 Md. at 515, 530 A.2d. at 285.
The court found that these factors were
satisfied in the present cases. Unavailability can be shown by establishing a sufficient necessity for allowing the child
witness to testisfy without viewing the
defendant. But, if the accuser should physically view the accused to enhance reliability, then it must be established that there is
an overriding "necessity" for allowing the
witness to testify without viewing the
defendant, which results in the child's
"unavailability"
for
a face-to-face
encounter.Id. at 516, 530 A.2d at 285. The
court went on to consider the "epidemic"
of child abuse, and the obstacles to effective prosecution of an alleged offender
when the principle witness is a young
child. The court noted that the victim can
be further traumatized by giving testimony, in open court, face-to-face with the
alleged abuser. Id. Moreover, the legislature recognized the need to protect the
child victim from the trauma associated
with open court testimony by enacting §
9-102.
Notwithstanding the desirability of protecting child victims, there must be evidence that the particular child witness will
be traumatized by testifying in open court.
Id. at 519, 530 A.2d at 286. If there is a
finding that the patticular child victim will
be traumatized by open court testimony,
§ 9-102 may be invoked and the child victim becomes "unavailable" for open court
testimony.Id. But it is the judge who must
determine "that testimony by the child
victim in the courtroom will result in the
child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate," in accordance with the standard of § 9-102 (a)(i)(ii). Id. Therefore,
subsection (a)(iXii) acts as a condition precendent to the general application of
§ 9-102. Id. at 520, 530 A.2d at 287.
The court had to determine whether the
condition precedent of subsection (a)(iXii)
had been satisfied in both cases. McKoy
did not raise the issue of the child witness'
ability to communicate in open court, and
therefore, the court did not consider the
effect of subsection (a)(i)(ii) as applied in
his case. Wildermuth, however, raised the
issue of whether the condition precedent
had been established and the court limited
its examination to the finding in his case.
In Wildermuth's case, two expert
witnesses testified in general terms that

children would fmd it "hard to respond"
to questions in open court or would be
"intimidated" which could result in a
"greater likelihood of inability to
respond." Id. at 521, 530 A.2d at 287.
Additionally, the judge neither questioned
nor observed the child witness before
granting the use of closed-circuit televi-

sion.Id.
The court concluded that the requisite
finding of subsection (a)(iXii) had not been
established absent a specific showing that
the patticular child witness would be
traumatized such that the child could not
reasonably communicate. Id. Moreover,
the judge should observe and question the
child witness in order to more fairly determine the need to invoke the statute. Id.
Also, expert witnesses must be specific and
discuss the detrimental effect of open court
testifying on the particular child. Id. Since
evidence of the necessity of allowing the
child witness to testify via closed-circuit
television was not established under the
standards set forth in Roberts, the court
reversed Wildermuth's conviction and
remanded for further proceedings.

-In McKoy's case, the judge had the
opportunity to determine that the child
could not reasonably communicate in
open court. Therefore, the invocation of §
9-102 was proper, and for the reasons discussed previously, McKoy's conviction
was affirmed since his right to confrontation was not violated.
As a result of the holding in Wildermuth
v. State, there must be sufficient evidence
that the patticular child witness will suffer
trauma to such an extent that it interferes
with the child's ability to communicate
before the invocation of § 9-102, and that
ordinarily the judge must be given the
opportunity to observe and question the
child before that finding is made. The
question remains whether the court's holding with respect to subsection (a)(i)(ii) is
such a high standard that it substantially
bars the invocation of § 9-102 and undermines the intent of § 9-102, which taken as
a whole, is to "minimize" the trauma associated with open court testimony.
-Kelly Walfred Miller
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